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PRE-EMPTION OF LOCAL CONTROL, CONCORDE
AND OTHER RECENT CASES
JOSHUA A. Muss
The efforts of British Airways Board ("British Airways") and
Compagnie Nationale Air France ("Air France") to secure Ameri-
can landing rights for Concorde, their supersonic airliner, have
produced a controversy of unexpected proportion. The disputes
engendered have threatened to affect the international relationships
of the United States and have put in issue principles of federalism
as related to the locus of authority to regulate aircraft noise emis-
sions. The focus of this controversy has been the attempt to secure
landing rights for Concorde at John F. Kennedy International
Airport ("JFK") as access port to the lucrative New York-Paris/
London market. These efforts resulted in 18 months of extensive
litigation which is likely to be resolved only by the United States
Supreme Court.
The central legal issue raised by the Concorde question concerns
whether the federal government has pre-empted the authority of
airport proprietors to regulate noise emission levels for aircraft using
their facilities. Since 1975, this issue has been litigated in four
cases with the courts arriving at differing conclusions.1 An exami-
nation of the facts and legal precedents relating to the pre-emption
question raised by Concorde is the best means of clarifying the
issues and giving insight into their ultimate resolution. In order to
separate the issues from the emotional volatility that has attached
to Concorde it is necessary to examine the historical background
of Concorde, the federal legislative history of the regulation of
' British Airways Bd. v. Port Auth. of N.Y., 558 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1977);
National Av. v. City of Haywood, 418 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Air
Transp. Ass'n of Amer. v. Crotti, 389 F. Supp. 58 (N.D. Cal. 1975); and San
Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Superior Court, 67 Cal. App. 3d 361, 136 Cal. Rptr.
557 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 98 S.Ct. 184 (1977).
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aircraft noise and the judicial interpretation of the law and its
application to the Concorde question.
In 1962 Britain and France, in a bold attempt to regain a share
of the world market for commercial airplanes for their aviation
industries and to enhance their sagging prestige as industrial
powers, entered a treaty to jointly construct a commercial airliner
capable of carrying 150 passengers across the North Atlantic at
supersonic speeds.' The project was ambitiously named "Con-
corde." The engineering and economic difficulties which have
plagued Concorde first appeared shortly after its birth. In 1963 it
was discovered that the initial design of the airplane developed a
cruising range which was 500 miles less than the distance from
London to New York. The consequent redesign was the first of
many, and the cost revision attributable thereto presaged many
upward revisions in the cost estimates of the project. The initial
cost estimate of £95 million was revised to £275 million.' As if
predestined by this inauspicious beginning, it has been all downhill
for Concorde ever since.
Concorde has been a commercial, engineering and economic
failure. The cost of the project has risen 15-fold from the initial
estimate of £95 million ($266 million) to an early 1977 estimate
of £1460 million ($2540 million).'
The reported costs of Concorde do not represent the true costs
of the project to the partners; they only represent the aggregate
annual expenditures over the life of the project without any ad-
justment for current price levels or exchange rates and without any
allocation of interest for fund utilization. With such additions, it
has been estimated that Concorde's total cost is £4,260 million
($7,400 million).' In the course of design, not only did the cost
of the airplane increase, but concurrently its range and passenger
2Mah 2, approximately 1400 miles per hour.
3 Gillman, Supersonic Bust-The Story of the Concorde, ATLANTIC MoNTIrH.y,
Jan. 1977, at 78 [hereinafter cited as Supersonic Bust].
4 Conversion to dollars has been made at current exchange rates-$1.74 per
pound. In 1959 the rate was $2.80 per pound. The official British government
figures of the development costs of Concorde are £1154 millon. To this cost
must be added the production costs of Concorde and the operating losses which
British Airways and Air France have sustained, estimated at £306 million. These
additions raise the total to £1460 million. Id. at 73-74.
5 Estimate by David Henderson, Professor of Political Economy at University
College, London, as reported in Supersonic Bust, supra note 3, at 73.
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capacity decreased and its fuel consumption increased. Ultimately,
the transatlantic payload of Concorde in actual operations was
reduced to 100 passengers from the initial plan of 150 passengers.
In 1967 the sales manager for British Aircraft Corporation, the
prime contractor for Britain's Concorde participation, predicted
"on the most pessimistic assumptions, sales of 225 Concordes by
1975. ' 'o In 1967, Concorde achieved its highwater mark in sales
by registering options of 74 aircraft to 16 airlines.
Ultimately, only British Airways and Air France exercised their
options. So far only nine of the sixteen planes which have been
constructed have been sold, and no purchasers are in sight for the
remaining seven.' Thus, from the first, Concorde has been a venture
conceived more out of desperation than realistic expectations, de-
formed and maladapted for survival since birth, and incapable of
self sustenance without massive external aid.
The inherent economic disabilities of Concorde have been aggra-
vated by its emergence as an important symbol for American en-
vironmental interests. It is almost certain that a great deal of the
antagonism to Concorde is engendered by its potential for reacti-
vating the drive for an American supersonic transport ("SST").
In 1970 the Senate narrowly rejected a multibillion dollar ap-
propriation for the development of an American SST. This rejec-
tion was to a great extent attributable to intense large scale lobby-
ing by various environmental groups. The case for SST was ser-
iously damaged by the difficulties encountered by Concorde. When
Concorde failed to secure any significant number of orders, its
latent threat as a challenge to American domination in the pro-
duction of commercial aircraft faded. Thus, even a limited demon-
stration of success by Concorde, however defined, jeopardizes the
finality of the environmental lobby's victory over SST. Congress,
if freed from the constant reminder of Concorde's failure, might
0 Id. at 79.
Five planes were sold to British Airways and four to Air France. NEWSWEEK,
May 23, 1977, at 20.
8 On December 3, 1970, the Senate by a vote of 52-41 passed an amendment
to the House-passed appropriation for the Department of Transportation, H.R.
17755, which deleted from the bill a $290 million appropriation for a prototype
SST. This amendment effectively ended the efforts to secure public financing for
development of an American SST. A year earlier, a similar amendment had failed
to pass. 116 Cong. Rec. S39,798 (1970).
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be less inclined to resist the aeronautical lobby's plea for SST as a
replacement for the now apparently abandoned B-1 bomber. Addi-
tionally, any modicum of success might rekindle the British and
French interest in further Concorde development and precipitate
the expansion, modification, or refinement of the project. Such
action by the Concorde partners would certainly provide new im-
petus for supporters of the American SST.9
A decision early in program development has provided Con-
corde's adversaries with a technical basis for attack. In the early
1960's, two British jet engine building firms, Rolls-Royce and
Bristol-Siddeley, competed for the contract to supply Concorde's
power plant. In its proposal, Rolls-Royce demonstrated substantial
concern for the noise emission characteristics of the engines."
After noting that the Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey ("Port Authority") had established a limitation of 112
Perceived Noise Decibels ("PNdb") for takeoffs from JFK, Rolls'
report concluded that "the next generation of subsonics is being
designed to be appreciably quieter-of the order of 100 PNdB-
and this is the order to which the supersonic should be designed
throughout."'1 The engine contract, however, was awarded to a
consortium of Bristol and SNECMA, the French engine manu-
facturer, for a power plant based on the Olympus engine. Despite
substantial research and expenditures of over $100 million, the
efforts to reduce the engine noise emission characteristics of the
Olympus engine below 112 PNdb were unsuccessful." The failure
to reduce noise emissions was in part attributable to the increased
thrust requirements of the engine as a consequence of Concorde's
9 The proposed fiscal year 1979 authorization of appropriation for the Na-
tional Aeronautic and Space Administration (NASA) includes funds for the
further work on Supersonic Cruise Aircraft Research (SCAR). H.R. 11401, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 124 CONG. REC. H3164 (1978). On April 25, 1978, the House
passed this bill, including $27.9 million for SCAR. 124 CONG. REC. H3190 (1978).
The Senate passed a modified version of the bill on May 18, 1978, approving
$23.9 million for SCAR. 124 CONG. REC. S7680 (1978).
10Supersonic Bust, supra note 3, at 77.
1 Id. at 77.
12 British Airways Bd. v. Port Auth. of N.Y., 558 F.2d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1977).
By adopting severely restrictive operating procedures such as limitations on selec-
tions of runways, steep banks after takeoffs and rapid climbs, Concorde has been
able to stay within the 112 PNdb restriction. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION,
THE SECRETARY'S DECISION ON CONCORDE SUPERSONIC TRANSPORT 20 n.32 (Feb.
4, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Coleman Report].
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increase in weight" and the early 1950 origins of the basic Olympus
engine. Additionally, the sound generated by Concorde has sub-
stantially more low frequency content than that of subsonic jet
engines, and consequently the noise causes more vibrations in
homes and buildings in Concorde's sound footprint.1' Concorde's
foes have focused their attack on these unfavorable noise char-
acteristics and have used the noise issue to recruit the Port Au-
thority as a primary participant in their controversy.
The Port Authority was one of the first airport operators to recog-
nize that the Authority's three terminals, Newark, LaGuardia, and
JFK, adjoin heavily populated built up areas." Since 1952, the mu-
nicipalities which adjoin JFK have had a long history of unsuccess-
ful attempts to restrict noise disturbances in their communities by
the use of their police powers to control aircraft operations." In
1951, in response to the noise emission history of military jets, the
Port Authority adopted a regulation which prohibited jet or prop
jet operations from any facilities of the Port Authority without its
permission." This rule is still in effect.1" In the mid-1950's the Port
Authority invoked this regulation to refuse landing rights to an
early model of the British pure-jet Comet and to Boeing's proto-
3The initial specification of 30,000 lbs. thrust was increased to 38,000 lbs.
thrust for the production engines. Supersonic Bust, supra note 3, at 78-79.
14 See Coleman Report, supra note 12, at 42-44.
"5 The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey is a body corporate and
politic created in 1921 by an interstate compact between the states of New York
and New Jersey. In addition to New York's three airports, the Authority owns
and operates various terminals, tunnels, and bridges in the New York City area,
the World Trade Center, the New York and New Jersey harbor facilities, and
other facilities of commerce in the New York and New Jersey metropolitan area.
" The municipalities passed various ordinances establishing minimum aircraft
altitudes and maximum noise emission levels for overflying aircraft. These ordi-
nances were invalidated in American Airlines v. Town of Hempstead, 272 F.
Supp. 226 (E.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd, 398 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1017 (1969) and Allegheny Airlines v. Village of Cedarhurst, 132 F.
Supp. 871 (E.D.N.Y. 1955), afl'd, 238 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1956). The villages of
Cedarhurst and Hempstead as well as the villages of Lawrence and Atlantic Beach
filed amicus curiae briefs in the Concorde litigation.
11 Defendants' Memorandum of Law at 7-10, British Airways Bd. v. Port
Auth. of N.Y., 431 F. Supp. 1216 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
s Port Authority Board of Commissioners' Minutes and Resolution, Mar. 11,
1976, as cited in Defendant's Memorandum of Law at 5, British Airways Bd. v.
Port Auth. of N.Y., 431 F. Supp. 1216 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) [hereinafter cited as
Port Authority Resolution].
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type jet transport.1 ' Both refusals were based on the excessive noise
levels that the aircraft would impose on the adjoining communities.
In 1955 the Port Authority commissioned a study to determine
maximum acceptable noise for aircraft using its facilities."0 The
standard adopted pursuant to this study was a single event noise
level of 112 PNdb, approximately the sound produced by a DC-6B,
the dominant airliner of that era. This standard is still in force
today.1 To a large extent, as a consequence of the Port Authority's
leadership, aircraft manufacturers developed noise suppressing de-
vices for their engines and operating procedures for their aircraft
wihch would satisfy the Port Authority's standards."'
In late summer of 1975, British Airways and Air France ap-
plied to the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") for amend-
ment to their operating specifications 3 to permit use of the Con-
corde at Dulles and JFK. On February 4, 1976, Secretary of
Transportation William T. Coleman, Jr., issued a report which
constituted a provisional consent by the federal government for
the airlines to conduct limited Concorde operations into the United
States.24
On March 11, 1976, in response to this notification the Port
Authority adopted a resolution, denying Concorde permission to
operate at JFK. " This ban was to continue until the completion of
a Port Authority-commissioned independent evaluation of noise
data and community reaction to Concorde based on a six-months
study at Dulles, Charles DeGaulle and Heathrow airports.' The
Port Authority, while acknowledging the Concorde's sponsors claim
that it can meet the 112 PNdb standard,2 ' expressed concern that
19 Defendants' Memorandum of Law at 6, British Airways Bd. v. Port Auth.
of N.Y., 431 F. Supp. 1216 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).20 1 d. at 7.
' i d. at 5-9.22 Id. at 7.
2' "Operations Specifications" which are issued pursuant to 14 C.F.R. § 129
(1975), include a list of the carriers' routes, airports served, flight procedures
and type of aircraft to be utilized.
'4 Coleman Report, supra note 12, at 2. For a full discussion of the Coleman
Report, the background and content of the subsequent controversy, and the re-
sultant litigation see Donin, British Airways v. Port Authority: Its Impact on
Aircraft Noise Regulation, 43 J. AIR L. & COM. 691 (1978).
"Port Authority Resolution, supra note 18.
26 Id.
217 Minutes of Mar. 11, 1976, Port Authority Board of Commissioners Meeting
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the aircraft's unique noise characteristics!" would aggravate the
present serious aircraft noise problem at JFK.3 Sixteen months
later in July, 1977, the ban was still in effect, and the evaluation
upon which its conclusion was dependent was not yet completed 30
On March 17, 1976, in response to the ban, British Airways and
Air France commenced an action in federal court seeking a declara-
tory judgment and an injunction banning the Port Authority from
enforcing its Concorde ban. In part the complaint conteded that
the Port Authority ban was unlawful in that the regulation of air-
craft flight operations was a field which had generally been pre-
empted by the federal government and that the regulation of land-
ing rights for Concorde had been specifically pre-empted by Sec-
retary Coleman's decision. "
as quoted in Defendants' Memorandum of Law at 13, Britsh Airways Bd. v. Port
Auth. of N.Y., 431 F. Supp. 1216 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Further, in April, 1977,
the airlines submitted to the FAA and to the Port Authority a technical noise
study which specified operating procedures which predicted noise levels within
the JFK limits. The FAA has acknowledged that the "analysis is technically
sound." FAA letter to British Aircraft Corp. (U.S.A.) appended to the Brief for
United States as amicus curiae, British Airways Bd. v. Port Auth. of N.Y., 558
F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1977).
2" See Coleman Report, supra note 12, at 44-50.
In justification of the ban, the resolution in part stated:
[T]he Secretary's decision raises a number of significant questions
concerning the effect of low frequency noise and vibrations gen-
erated by the Concorde and the airplane's overall impact on the
noise environment in the area surrounding Kennedy .... The unique
noise characteristics of the Concorde and the expected aggravated
community response to this noise add new and serious dimensions
to the present aircraft noise problem, one not necessarily reflected
in the Port Authority's current noise standard. . . . It does not ap-
pear to be in the public interest to test the subjective characteristics
of noise response to the Concorde in the densely populated areas
around Kennedy International Airport.
Port Authority Resolution, supra note 18, at 13-14.
"0 On July 7, 1977, the Port Authority Board met and voted to continue the
Concorde ban for an indefinite period of time. The Minutes of that meeting state:
Our reports indicate that the Concorde operations proposed in the
[airlines'] report of March, 1977, can be expected to result in sig-
nificant annoyance and complaint activity regarding the noisiness
and house vibration effects of Concorde's noise in particular, and an
increase in such activity about aircraft noise in general in some com-
munities near JFK. A vibration rattle index is being further studied
to quantify this noise factor. However, more research and analysis
is needed before such an index can be established.
As quoted in British Airways Bd. v. Port Auth. of N.Y., 437 F. Supp. 804, 816
(S.D.N.Y. 1977).
3' British Airways Bd. v. Port Auth. of N.Y., 431 F. Supp. 1216 (S.D.N.Y.
1977) [hereinafter cited as Concorde I].
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On May 11, 1977, U. S. District Court Justice for the Southern
District of New York Milton Pollack granted summary judgment
to the plaintiff airline companies and enjoined the Port Authority
from further banning Concorde operations at JFK.' Judge Pollack
based his decision on a finding that Secretary Coleman's authoriza-
tion of Concorde landings at JFK and his establishment of a de-
tailed regulation for noise control specifically precluded a conflict-
ing exercise of power by the Port Authority. ' Accordingly, Judge
Pollack found it "unnecessary to treat the other grounds on which
the plaintiffs seek relief, viz., the claimed conflict of the Port
Authority resolution with the international agreements and foreign
policy.""
The Port Authority appealed Judge Pollack's order to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. At the
request of the Second Circuit, the Justice Department filed an
amicus curiae brief on the question of federal pre-emption of local
authority to regulate aircraft noise. That brief reviewed the relevant
statutes, their legislative history, and the practice of federal regula-
tion of aviation noise. The government concluded that it was Con-
gress' intent to permit airport proprietors to impose nondiscrimi-
natory, reasonable noise emission standards. The government's
position, which was adopted by the circuit court, maintained that
"under the existing statutory framework, Congress did not intend
to provide, and the Executive did not intend to exercise, the power
to pre-empt an airport proprietor from excluding any aircraft on
the basis of noise considerations."' On June 14, 1977, the appellate
court reversed Judge Pollock's decision and remanded the case
for further hearing. Chief Judge Kaufman, speaking for a unani-
mous court, found "the ground for Judge Pollack's grant of sum-
mary judgment. .. simply untenable."'"
-u Id. at 1226.
33 Id. at 1223.
34 Id. at 1226.
35 Brief for the United States, as amicus curiae, British Airways Bd. v. Port
Auth. of N.Y., 558 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1977).
' British Airways Bd. v. Port Auth. of N.Y., 558 F.2d 75, 81-82 (2d Cir.
1977) [hereinafter cited as Concorde 11]. The case was remanded to the district
court for determination of whether or not the Port Authority's 13-months delay
in promulgating a noise emission standard for Concorde was unreasonable, and
whether such delay was so excessive as to constitute unfair discrimination and
an undue burden on commerce. On August 17, 1977, the district court concluded
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The far reaching impact of an otherwise trivial event7 explains
the intensity of the interest in this issue and the willingness of the
protagonists to invest substantial time and money in the prosecution
of their position. The political and economic forces in tension in
this controversy precluded either side from compromising its posi-
tion or from accepting the decision of a lower court. Further, the
outside agencies which could independently terminate the matter
failed to intervene.
Concorde's sponsors, Great Britain and France, cannot concede
the exclusion of the aircraft from the lucrative and prestigious New
York transatlantic run. Failure to gain access to this market will
require that they continue to subsidize the Concorde related operat-
ing losses of their flag carrying airlines.' Air France estimates its
total Concorde losses to be $44 million.' The importance of the
New York run to the viability of Concorde is demonstrated from
Air France's estimates that its four Concordes would each have to
fly 2750 hours per year with a 65 percent load factor to break
even on an operational basis. In 1976 Air France averaged 1190
hours per aircraft. It estimates that access to New York would add
1550 hours per year per aircraft to its operating time. In 1976
British Airways averaged an 85 percent load factor on the Wash-
ington/London run on an average of just under 85 saleable seats
that the delay in developing a standard for Concorde had been "excessive and
unjustified and that the ban is discriminatory, arbitrary and unreasonable." Bri-
tish Airways Bd. v. Port Auth. of N.Y., 437 F. Supp. 804, 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
[hereinafter cited as Concorde 111]. The court enjoined the Port Authorty from
continuing its Concorde ban. On September 29, 1977, the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit affirmed the district court order. British Airways Bd. v. Port
Auth. of N.Y., 564 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Concorde IV].
On October 17, 1977, Justice Marshall of the Supreme Court rejected a Port
Authority request for authority to maintain its Corcorde ban until the Court
had an opportunity to review the lower courts' decisions. Subsequently, the Port
Authority did not appeal the circuit court's ruling. On November 27, 1977, com-
mercial Concorde service was initiated into JFK.
"Six additional takeoffs and landings at two airports whose combined daily
traffic exceeds 1500 such movements per day. Coleman Report, supra note 12, at
49.
88 "Exact loss figures for Concorde operations between U.S. and Europe are,
according to airline officials, difficult to assess." Air France estimates its overall
Concorde operations produced operating losses for 1976 of $26 million, and Bri-
tish Airways estimates its operating losses attributable to Concorde operations
at $14 million. Operating costs do not include capital and other indirect costs of
operation. International Herald Tribune, July 29, 1977, at 1, col. 3.
3 Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., May 9, 1977, at 22.
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per flight. In the same period, Air France operated an overall 66.3
percent load factor based on an average of 90 saleable seats. The
distance from Washington to London/Paris approaches the range
limits of Concorde and, consequently, the normal 100-passenger
capacity of the aircraft must periodically be diminished when the
wind and/or atmospheric temperatures and other aeronautic fac-
tors are adverse."0 Further, lack of a New York landing right would
terminate the faint remaining prospect for an economic salvation
for the Concorde program. This lingering hope, however tenuous,
is based on the assumption that once granted access to JFK, the
aircraft will become so popular that for self protection Pan Ameri-
can Airlines and Trans World Airlines will acquire and operate
Concordes. Thereafter, Britain, France, and the United States will
cooperate in the development and production of the next genera-
tion of supersonic aircraft.'
The parties in power in Britain and France have tenuous con-
trol of government, and neither seems willing to risk the political
repercussions which would emanate from an admission of the
failure of Concorde. Understandably, both French President Valery
Giscard D'Estaing and British Prime Minister James Callahan im-
plored President Carter to assist the Concorde. Additionally, both
warned of the damage to American foreign relations with their
countries which would result from a continuing Concorde ban, at
JFK.42
The forces at work on the Port Authority to maintain or re-
institute the Concorde ban at JFK are also great. While the twelve
commissioners who constitute the governing body of the authority
are appointed, not elected, they are certainly not immune from
political influence. The governors of New York and New Jersey
each appoint six residents of their states to be members of the
commission, and either governor may veto a Port Authority reso-
lution. New Jersey's Governor Brendon Byrne, whose constituents
are not directly affected by the Port Authority's Concorde decision,
has announced that he will support whatever decision the New
York commissioners reach. ' New York's Governor Hugh Carey
40 Id.
4 Supersonic Bust, supra note 3, at 80.
The New York Times, Sept. 16, 1977, at A8, col. 1.
The governor's decision was no doubt influenced by the knowledge that the
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has been in the vanguard in his opposition to Concorde. In 1976,
the legislature of the state of New York passed, and the governor
signed, legislation which would mandate the Port Authority to
deny the use of JFK to Concorde." The governor was undoubtedly
influenced by the activism of the groups representing environmental
interests and the predominately middle class, independent voters
who live in the vicinity of JFK.'
Secretary Coleman's report estimated that approximately 485,-
000 residents in New York City's borough of Queens and the
nearby suburban areas of Nassau County are affected by aircraft
noise emissions from operations at JFK.' The demagogic solution
to Concorde's equation makes Governor Carey's and the Port
Authority's tenacious opposition to Concorde easy to understand.
The court of appeals decision may not have terminated the Con-
corde controversy nor have finally resolved the issues of federal
pre-emption. The current injunction, as modified by the court of
appeals does not preclude the Port Authority from developing a
nondiscriminatory standard which would in effect prohibit Con-
corde landings at JFK in the future. Accordingly, the extent of
the federal government's pre-emption of the Port Authority's power
to regulate aircraft noise emission may yet again be at issue in a
Concorde-centered controversy. Alternatively, the pre-emption issue
is likely to be resurrected in the context of a confrontation between
domestic or foreign airlines, airport proprietors, and a public with
a substantially increased environmental awareness.
The phoenix-like quality of the pre-emption issue makes it un-
likely that the matter will be finally put to rest without either con-
gressional action or a decision of the United States Supreme Court.
The Congress of the United States could resolve the pre-emption
conflict by passing appropriate legislation,' but it is not likely to
intervene.
runways of the Port Authority's New Jersey air terminal, Newark Airport, are
too short to accommodate Concorde (9800 feet long versus a required 13,250
feet). NEW YORKER, Apr. 4, 1977, at 91.
"New Jersey did not pass concurrent legislation. A federal court ruled that
the New York statute was inoperative in the absence of such action by New Jer-
sey. Brown v. Carey, No. 76-CV-103 (N.D.N.Y. May 13, 1976).
'New York Times, July 8, 1977, § A, at 1, col. 1; NEW YORKER, Apr. 4,
1977, at 91.
Coleman Report, supra note 12, at 47.
4? See discussion infra notes 52-85 and accompanying text.
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The vocal and activist opposition which developed to Concorde
from local domestic environmental groups and Kennedy area resi-
dents demonstrates why it is easy for Congress to duck this issue.
As the Washington Post observed, the legislative bodies have pur-
posely avoided the question and, consequently their responsibility,
preferring to pass to the courts "not only the responsibility for a
fair decision but the criticism that will inevitably flow from it.""
A Supreme Court resolution of the issues in the context of a
case similar to the Concorde litigation would provide a final de-
termination of the extent of the pre-emption by the federal govern-
ment of an airport proprietor's authority to regulate the noise emis-
sions of aircraft using its facilities. The general issue of federal
pre-emption of the regulation of aircraft noise emissions has re-
ceived much legislative and judicial attention. The subject has
been addressed by two federal statutes and by the Supreme Court
in City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc." Since Bur-
bank, in addition to the decision of the court of appeals in the
subject Concorde case, three courts explored the extent of federal
pre-emption of an airport proprietor's authority to regulate aircraft
noise emissions and have arrived at differing opinions." In order
to evaluate the philosophical rationale underlying these decisions
and to synthesize from them a doctrine applicable to the issue, it
is first necessary to examine the general concept of pre-emption;
to understand the existing legislative scheme, its history and ad-
ministrative enforcement; and to apply the judicial interpretation
of the relevant statutes and regulations.
"The Washington Post, quoted in the International Herald Tribune, July 11,
1977, at 6, col. 1.
*'The 1968 Aircraft Noise Abatement Amendments to the 1958 Federal
Aviation Act codified at S 611 of the 1958 Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1431, which was
adopted by Congress July 21, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-411, 82 Stat. 395 (1968),
and the Noise Conrol Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 1234, also codified at 49 U.S.C.
1431 (1973).
50 411 U.S. 624 (1973). The Court held that the federal government had pre-
empted state and local governments from exercising their police powers to control
aircraft noise emissions. For further discussion, see notes 129-139 infra and ac-
companying text.
1 National Av. v. City of Hayward, Cal., 418 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1976);
Air Transp. Ass'n of Amer. v. Crotti, 389 F. Supp. 58 (N.D. Cal. 1975); San
Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Superior Court, 67 Cal. App. 3d 361, 136 Cal. Rptr.
557 (Ct. App. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S.Ct. 184 (1977).
COMMENTS
Pre-Emption Doctrine
The concept of pre-emption by the federal government of a
state's authority to regulate in a field is a corollary to the Suprem-
acy Clause of the Constitution, Article VI, Clause 2. The Suprem-
acy Clause invalidates state enactments which conflict directly with
federal statutes in a field which the Constiution has reserved to
the federal government. The concept of pre-emption, which is
derived from the Supremacy Clause, does not require direct con-
flict for its invocation."2 The impact of pre-emption is also wider
than that of the exercise of federal power under the Supremacy
Clause. A state's entire power to regulate in, a field is negated
under the concept of pre-emption while under the Supremacy
Clause only those statutes which are in conflict with federal legis-
lation or the Constitution are invalid. State regulation is pre-
empted where it stands as "an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."" The
Court has identified two general categories as constituting such
obstacles: (1) those situations where there is "such actual conflict
between the two schemes of regulation that both cannot stand in
the same area;" or (2) those areas where there exists "a congres-
sional design to pre-empt the field."'"
The Supreme Court has held that federal pre-emption of states
from regulating in a field of commerce should be avoided in the
absence of a "persuasive reason" ' and a finding that the super-
session of historic state police powers was "the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress."' " Additionally, the Court has developed two
guidelines for the determination of the existence of a congressional
design to occupy the field: those instances where "the nature of
the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion or that
Congress has unmistakably so ordained.""' The approach to pre-
2 For a full discussion of the concept and application of the pre-emption doc-
trine, see: The Pre-Emption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the
Burger Court, 75 COLuM. L. REv. 623 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Pre-Emption
Doctrine]; and Note, Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of
Construction, STAN. L. REv. (1959). [hereinafter cited as Preferential Ground].
" Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
"Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141 (1963).
"Id. at 142.
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
S Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).
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emption which is dependent on the nature of the subject matter
regulated stems from Cooley v. Board of Wardens." Such subjects
do not require explicit congressional action to support a finding of
pre-emption."' The ordination of Congress for pre-emption can be
invoked directly by express statutory language or indirectly by
implicit expression of congressional intent. In Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevators Corp.," Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, summa-
rized the varying grounds from which earlier decisions had inferred
congressional intent for pre-emption. These grounds were:
(1) "The scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as
to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no
room for the states to supplement it." 1
(2) "(T)he act of Congress may touch a field in which the fed-
eral interest is so dominant that the federal system will be
assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same
subject."62
(3) "(T)he object sought to be obtained by the federal law and
the character of obligations imposed by it may reveal (the
intent to preclude local regulation).""
(4) "(T)he state policy may produce a result inconsistent with
the objective of the federal statute.""
The criteria established in Rice were most recently reaffirmed by
the Supreme Court in Burbank and Perez v. Campbell.'
Since a determination of congressional intent is a prerequisite to
a decision as to whether a field of regulation has been pre-empted
by the federal government, it is not surprising that an examination
of the relevant Supreme Court decisions emphasizes the import-
ance of the subject matter in determining the outcome of the deci-
sion. "Pre-emption's diversity and breadth of application makes
-1653 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1852). "Whatever subjects of this power [to regu-
late commerce] are in their nature national, or admit only of one uniform system,
or plan of regulation, may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require ex-
clusive legislation by Congress." Id. at 319.
9 See Pre-Emption Doctrine, supra note 52, at 624-26.





- 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
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abstract principles only the roughest of guides. A certain subject
matter can bring Justice to an unexpected side of a controversy....
What matters, along with the subject matter at hand, are dominant
and long-sustained attitudes toward federalism."" Justice Douglas
observed in tracing the history of the Supreme Court decisions on
pre-emption that "our prior cases on pre-emption are not precise
guidelines in the present controversy, for each case turns on the
peculiarities and special features of the federal regulatory scheme
in question.""7
A large part of the difficulty in determining the direction which
the Court is taking in cases involving the pre-emption doctrine is in-
herent in the dependence in a majority of the cases on discovering
an inferred expression of congressional intent. The question of pre-
emption is rarely directly addressed by Congress, and attempts to
recreate congressional intent are most analagous to attempting to
find a lost horse by postulating where you would go if you were a
horse and lost."'
Until 1973, the Court's decision emphasized the principle of
absolute supremacy of the federal government and the consequent
presumption for pre-emption." The pervasiveness of federal regu-
lation in a field was sufficient to infer congressional intent to pre-
empt state authority."0 In 1973, however, the Burger Court in a
decision, Goldstein v. California,"' signaled a change of direction.
Since then the trend of the Court has been away from inferring
"See Pre-Emption Doctrine, supra note 52, at 652.
07411 U.S. at 638.
68 By framing the pre-emption question in terms of specific congres-
sional intent the Supreme Court has manufactured difficulties for
itself. Apart from the difficult problem of defining what Congress'
and which congressman's intent is relevant, this manner of stating
the issue suggests that the pre-emption question was consciously
resolved and that only diligent effort is needed to reveal the in-
tended solution. But Congress, embroiled in controversy over policy
issues, rarely anticipates the possible ramifications of its acts upon
state law. Like the conflict of laws questions which are inherent
in state statutes but seldom articulated, pre-emption questions are
implicit in many federal statutes but remain for the courts to an-
swer.
Preferential Ground, supra note 52, at 209.
" See Pre-Emption Doctrine, supra note 52, at 630-32.
"0Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973); Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
71412 U.S. 546 (1973).
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congressional intent in the absence of an express legislative history
and a clear congressional mandate supporting such a position.
In a recent decision, the Supreme Court highlighted this change in
emphasis:
Often Congress does not clearly state in its legislation whether it
intends to pre-empt state laws; and in such instances, the courts
normally sustain local regulation on the same subject matter unless
it conflicts with federal law or would frustrate the federal scheme,
or unless the courts discern from the totality of the circumstances
that Congress sought to occupy the field and to the exclusion of the
states.72
In Goldstein the Court confronted the problem of federal pre-
emption in the context of the question of a state's authority to
regulate intrastate copyrights. The Court sustained such a Cali-
fornia act and at the same time established a new standard which
in effect created a presumption against pre-emption of states' rights
to concurrent regulation with the federal government. Thus, states
are not to be pre-empted unless the subject matters are "necessarily
national in impact" and "such conflicts will necessarily arise."
In subsequent decisions the Court has more fully developed and
articulated its current philosophy." The Court has recently empha-
sized this trend in a decision validating a California labor code
provision which prohibited an employer from knowingly employing
an alien who is not entitled to lawful residence in the United
States. ' Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Brennan observed
that it is inappropriate to presume a congressional intent to pre-
clude local regulation.
72 Malone v. White Motor Corp., - U.S. S. Ct. -, 55 L.Ed.2d
433, 450 (1978). See also Pre-Emption Doctrine, supra note 52, at 639-54.
73The Court quoted with approval from the Federalist Papers:
We must also be careful to distinguish those situations in which the
concurrent exercise of a power by the Federal Government and the
States or by the States alone may possibly lead to conflicts and those
situations where conflicts will necessarily arise. "It is not ... a mere
possibility of inconvenience in the exercise of powers, but an im-
mediate constitutional repugnancy than can by implication alienate
and extinguish a pre-existing right of [state] sovereignty." The Fed-
eralist No. 32, p. 243 (B. Wright ed. 1961).
412 U.S. at 554-55 (emphasis in the original).
74See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner
& Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973); and New York State Dep't of Social
Services v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973).
" DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
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Only a demonstration that complete ouster of state power-includ-
ing state power to promulgate laws not in conflict with federal
laws-was "the clear and manifest purpose of Congress" would
justify that conclusion (citations omitted).... (A) n independent
review does not reveal, any specific intention in the wording or the
legislative history of the (federal legislation) that Congress in-
tended to preclude even harmonious state regulation touching on
aliens in general, or in the employment of aliens in particular."0
Another Burger Court decision has raised questions as to the
continuing validity of the pervasiveness of federal regulation as a
basis for pre-emption. In New York State Department of Social
Service v. Dublino" the Court rejected a claim that a New York
regulation, which conditioned receipt of federal benefits (under
the Aid to Families with Dependent Children section of the Social
Security Act) on acceptance of proffered employment, was pre-
empted by a provision in the Social Security Act with similar intent.
The Court refused to infer pre-emption based on the pervasiveness
of the federal scheme of regulation. "The Court's rejection of the
preemptive significance of the comprehensive character of the fed-
eral program cast further doubt upon the continuing validity of
R ic e .
,,9 
8
While the decisions of the Burger Court in regard to pre-emption
are not doctrinally uniform, they do demonstrate an attitude to-
wards federalism which dictates a presumption against pre-emption
of states' regulatory power. Certainly this Court will not infer such
pre-emption lightly."
The instances when Congress has expressly stated the intent to
71424 U.S. at 357-58.
77413 U.S. 405 (1973).
70 Pre-Emption Docrine, supra note 52, at 646.
79 Two long-standing preemptive conditions-pervasiveness and poten-
tial conflict-have been reexamined. As to the former, the Court
indicated its protective attitude toward state power by depriving
complex federal regulatory schemes of any prima facie preemptive
implications. If the questioning of the latter leads to its permanent
rejection, the conflict ground will be thrust back to being merely
the correlative of specific intent to occupy the field embodied in the
"actual" conflict standard....
... The Burger Court's most recent decisions suggest that where
Congress has not made clear its intention to preempt, or where a
conflict is unripe or peripheral to the purpose of the federal statute,
state legislation will be allowed to stand.
Pre-Emption Doctrine, supra note 52, at 653.
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pre-empt state regulation in a field are rare.8 A majority of the
cases concerning pre-emption have therefore been dependent on a
judicial determination of the intent of Congress, and have accord-
ingly led to extensive reliance on the legislative history of the sub-
ject regulation. Unfortunately, forays into the legislative history
never produce clearcut or convincing results." Most frequently,
these exercises by the courts are only makeweights for decisions
reached by a determination of the compatibility of the state regu-
lation with the general purpose of the federal statute."' The legis,
lative and administrative histories of the relevant federal enact-
ments affecting the regulation of aircraft noise emissions are far
from conclusive to establish the intent of Congress in this regard.
Nonetheless, the courts which have addressed this question have
examined the extensive legislative history of the relevant legislation
and utilized their interpretation thereof to support their conclu-
sions." The problems inherent in attempting to decide the question
of pre-emption by reliance on and interpretation of the intent of
Congress is demonstrated by the Burbank case." There, the ma-
jority relied on its interpretation of the congressional purpose and
intent as determined from the legislative history of the controlling
statute as a basis for inferring the finding of pre-emption. One
commentator has noted "for each cite offered, Judge Rehnquist,
dissenting, countered with authority that the congressional intent
was not to disturb the existing federal, state, and local governments
balance of power."" Despite the obvious weakness of this approach,
the inquiries into legislative and administrative histories are none-
theless the best available evidence in the absence of a clear state-
ment of congressional purpose or intent.
"For example, the Warehouse Act, 7 U.S.C. § 241-273 (1970), explicitly
precludes state regulation of certain aspects of warehouse receipts.
"See Preferential Ground, supra note 52, at 209.
" Id. at 210. See also Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977), where
the Court invalidated the California regulation of the labeling requirement for
flour as pre-empted by the congressional purpose of the Fair Packaging and
Labeling Act.
"See discussion infra notes 140-96 and accompanying text.
" See discussion infra notes 125-39 and accompanying text.
"Warren, Airport Noise Regulation: Burbank, Aaron and Air Transport, 5
ENVT'L AFF. 97, 104 (1976).
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Legislative History
The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (the "Act")" as amended
governs the federal government's role in regulating air commerce.
The Act reaffirms the doctrine which was first established in the
Civil Aeronautics Act of 193887 that "the United States of America
is hereby declared to possess and exercise complete and exclusive
national sovereignty in the air space of the United States."8 The
Act assigned to the Federal Aviation Administrator primary re-
sponsibility to develop and administer federal programs for air
safety and for the promotion of air commerce." The 1966 legisla-
tion which created the Department of Transportation transferred
primary responsibility in both these areas to the Secretary of that
Department. It then reassigned to the Director of the Federal
Aviation Administration the responsibility for air safety.' In recog-
nition of the need for a standardized uniform system to control
the use of navigable air space, navigation facilities and air traffic
control systems, and the certification of pilots and aircraft, Con-
gress vested pre-emptive federal authority in the FAA. The Ad-
ministrator has been granted extensive and broad authority in
872 Stat. 731, 49 U.S.C. §5 1301 et seq. The first federal legislation in this
field was the Air Commerce Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 568. It was superceded by the
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 973, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301 et seq., which
was the immediate predecessor of the 1958 Act.
87 The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 provided that "there is recognized and
declared to exist in behalf of any citizen of the United States a public right of
freedom of transit in air commerce through the navigable air space of the United
States (June 23, 1938, Ch. 601, § 3, 52 Stat. 973)." 49 U.S.C. S 403 (1952).
8849 U.S.C. 5 1508(a) (1970).
8949 U.S.C. 5 1346 (1970).
"The basic national policies established in the Federal Aviation Act are set
forth in § 103, 49 U.S.C. § 1303 of that Act which provides public interest stan-
dards including:
(a) The regulation of air commerce in such manner as to best pro-
mote its development and safety and fulfill the requirement of na-
tional defense;
(b) The promotion, encouragement, and development of civil aero-
nautics;
(c) The control of the use of the navigable air space of the United
States and the regulation of both civil and military operations in
such airspace in the interest of the safety and efficiency of both;
(e) The development and operation of a common system of air
traffic control and navigation for both military and civil aircraft.
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order to attain the national policies recognized by the Act." The
courts which have considered the question have consistently ac-
knowledged the congressional intent to pre-empt state and local
governments from enforcing any regulation which affects airspace
use and management, aviation safety, and control of air traffic."
None of the federal enactments affecting aviation noise have
contained express statements concerning the question of federal
pre-emption of the field of regulation. In fact, the Act and its
predecessors were silent on the question of control of aircraft noise.
In 1968, Congress enacted an aircraft noise abatement amendment
to the Act which directed the FAA, after consultation with the
Secretary of Transportation, to prescribe rules for the control of
aircraft noise." On November 18, 1969, the FAA implemented
-Section 1348 of the Act provides in part:
(a) Use of airspace. The Administrator is authorized and directed
to develop plans for and formulate policy with respect to the use
of navigable airspace; and assign by rule, regulation, or order the
use of the navigable airspace under such terms, conditions, and
limitations as he may deem necessary in order to insure the safety
of aircraft and the efficient utilization of such airspace ...
(c) Air traffic rules. The Administrator is further authorized and
directed to prescribe air traffic rules and regulations governing the
flight of aircraft, for the navigation, protection, and identification
of aircraft, for the protection of persons and property on the
ground, and for the efficient utilization of the navigable airspace,
including rules as to safe altitudes of flight and rules for the pre-
vention of collision between aircraft, between aircraft and land or
water vehicles, and between aircraft and airborne objects.
"2Allegheny Airlines v. Village of Cedarhurst, 238 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1956);
Rosenham v. United States, 131 F.2d 932 (10th Cir. 1942); American Airlines
v. Town of Hempstead, 272 F. Supp. 226 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
"Codified at § 611 of the 1958 Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1431 (1970), which was
adopted by Congress July 21, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-411, 82 Stat. 395.
(a) Consultations; standards; rules and regulations.
In order to afford present and future relief and protection to the
public from unnecessary aircraft noise and sonic boom, the Admin-
istrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, after consultation
with the Secretary of Transportation, shall prescribe and amend
standards for the measurement of aircraft noise and sonic boom
and shall prescribe and amend such rules and regulations as he
may find necessary to provide for the control and abatement of air-
craft noise and sonic boom, including the application of such stan-
dards, rules, and regulations in the issuance, amendment, modifica-
tion, suspension, or revocation of any certificate authorized by this
subchapter.
(b) Considerations determinative of standards, rules, and regula-
tions.
In prescribing and amending standards, rules, and regulations under
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the provisions of Section 611 by promulgating regulations which
adopted a uniform technique for measuring aircraft sound emis-
sions and established the first aircraft noise limitations.' These
regulations set limits on the noise emission of aircraft of new design '
and dictated that the standards adopted would be extended to
newly manufactured aircraft of existing design as soon as the requi-
site technology was developed.'9
In response to what it perceived as foot dragging by the FAA in
implementing rules to reduce noise emissions for aircraft, Congress
passed the Noise Control Act of 1972.' This enactment amended
Section 611 of the Act to require consideration of the effect on the
"public health and welfare from aircraft noise and sonic boom;"
deleted the term "unnecessary" from the description of the noise
which the section intended to regulate; added the EPA to the rule-
making process;"' and prohibited certification of any new aircraft
which does not meet FAR-36 standards." The 1972 amendments
this section, the Administrator shall-
(1) consider relevant available data relating to aircraft noise and
sonic boom, including the results of research, development, test-
ing, and evaluation activities conducted pursuant to this chapter
and chapter 23 of this title;
(2) consult with such Federal, State and interstate agencies as he
deems appropriate;
(3) consider whether any proposed standard, rule or regulation
is consistent with the highest degree of safety in air commerce or
air transportation in the public interest;
(4) consider whether any proposed standard, rule or regulation
is economically reasonable, technologically practicable, and ap-
propriate for the particular type of aircraft, aircraft engine, ap-
pliance, or certificate to which it will apply; and
(5) consider the extent to which such standard, rule or regula-
tion will contribute to carrying out the purposes of this section.
"Federal Aviation Regulation, Part 36, 14 C.F.R. § 36 (1977) (FAR 36) es-
tablishes measuring points at standardized locations from which aircraft noise is
measured for certification purposes. Such measurements are specified at three
points, one under the approach path (one nautical mile from the runway), and
one to the side of the runway at the point from maximum noise during takeoff
(0.35 nautical miles for four-engine aircraft, 0.25 nautical miles for two and three-
engine aircraft). At these points the intensity of sound emission is measured, and
a "single event" noise measurement, usually expressed in Effective Perceived Noise
Level in decibels (EPNdb), is made.
9s 14 C.F.R. § 36.201 (1970).
"14 C.F.R. S 36.1 (1970).
"786 Stat. 1234, 49 U.S.C. S 1431 (Supp. V 1975).
849 U.S.C. § 1431(b)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
949 U.S.C. § 1431(b)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
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directed the Environmental Protection Agency to propose noise
control rules to the FAA which must publish the proposed rules in
30 days and commence hearings within 60 days.'" ' Within, a reason-
able time the FAA is required to either promulgate the proposed
rule, with or without modifications, or publish a notice declining
to promulgate the rule and explaining the reasons for its action.'0 '
The Department of Transportation and the FAA announced that
they will require the modification by retrofit or retirement of all
aircraft in the commercial fleet which do not yet meet the FAR-36
noise level.'"
The Senate Commerce Committee report on the 1968 noise
abatement amendment to the Federal Aviation Act is informative
of the congressional intent in regard to pre-emption of airport
proprietors from regulating the noise emissions of aircraft using
their facilities. The report emphasized the intent to continue the
prohibitions on the exercise by state and local governments of their
police powers to control the flight of aircraft.' The report further
quoted with approval from a letter from Secretary of Transporta-
tion Boyd which emphasized this intention.''
In regard to the bill's effect on the rights of airport proprietors,
the Committee endorsed Secretary Boyd's position.
049 U.S.C. § 1431(c)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
10149 U.S.C. § 143 1(c) (Supp. V 1975).
102 U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, AVIATION NOISE ABATEMENT POLICY 35-42
(1976) [hereinafter cited as ANAP]. The "retrofit or retire" time tables are: 8
years for B-720, B-707, DC-8, CV-990; and 6 years for B-727, B-737, DC-9,
BAC 1-11, and B-747. (About 45 early models do not meet the standards.) Ap-
proximately 77 percent of the present fleet (1654 aircraft) do not meet FAR 36
standards. Id. at 40-41.
"°'The report stated:
The bill is an amendment to a statute describing the powers and
duties of the Federal Government with respect to air commerce.
... It is not the intent of the committee in recommending this legis-
lation to effect any change in the existing apportionment of powers
between the Federal and State and local governments. . . . Of
course, the authority of units of local government to control the
effects of aircraft noise through the exercise of land use planning
and zoning powers is not diminished by the bill.
Finally, since the flight of aircraft has been preempted by the Fed-
eral Government, State and local governments can presently exercise
no control over sonic booms. The bill makes no change in this re-
gard.
S. REP. No. 1353, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1968).
104 The courts have held that the Federal Government presently pre-
empts the field of noise regulation insofar as it involves controlling
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In this regard, we concur in the following views set forth by the
Secretary in his letter to the committee on June 22, 1968: . . .
"the proposed legislation will not affect the rights of a State or
local public agency, as the proprietor of an airport, from issuing
regulations or establishing requirements as to the permissible level
of noise which can be created by aircraft using the airport. Air-
port owners acting as proprietors can presently deny the use of
their airports to aircraft on the basis of noise considerations so long
as such exclusion is nondiscriminatory. ' 105
Thus, the legislative history of the Noise Control Act of 1972 re-
affirms the congressional intent to pre-empt state and local police
powers in the field of regulation of aircraft operations, but to leave
unchanged the power of airport proprietors to establish regulation
of aircraft noise emissions."
The Senate report of the Committee of Public Works on Senate
Bill 3342 stated:
the flight of aircraft. Local noise control legislation limiting the
permissible noise level of all overflying aircraft has recently been
struck down because it conflicted with Federal regulation of air traf-
fic. American Airlines v. Town of Hempstead, 272 F. Supp. 226
(E.D.N.Y. 1966) .... H.R. 3400 would merely expand the Federal
Government's role in a field already preempted. It would not change
this preemption. State and local governments will remain unable to
use their police powers to control aircraft noise by regulating the
flight of aircraft.
Id. at 6.
'" Id. The Secretary's letter went on to say:
Just as an airport owner is responsible for deciding how long the
runways will be, so is the owner responsible for obtaining noise
easements necessary to permit the landing and takeoff of the air-
craft. The federal government is in no position to require an airport
to accept service by a larger aircraft and, for that purpose, to ob-
tain additional noise easements. The issue is the service desired by
the airport owner and the steps it is willing to take to obtain the
service. In dealing with this issue, the federal government should
not substitute its judgment for that of the states or elements of local
government who, for the most part, own and operate our nation's
airports. The proposed legislation is not designed to do this and will
not prevent airport proprietors from excluding any aircraft on the
basis of noise considerations.
Id. at 7.
...The House Report which accompanied H.R. 11021 provides:
[N]o provision of the bill is intended to alter in any way the rela-
tionship between the authority of the Federal Government and that
of the State and local governments that existed with respect to mat-
ters covered by section 611 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958
prior to the enactment of the bill.
H.R. RaP. No. 92-842, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1972).
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States and local governments are preempted from establishing or
enforcing noise emission standards for aircraft unless such stand-
ards are identical to standards prescribed under this bill. This does
not address responsibilities or powers of airport operators, and no
provision of the bill is intended to alter in any way the relationship
between the authority of the Federal government and that of the
State and local governments that existed with respect to matters
covered by section 611 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 prior
to the enactment of the bill.107
Senate Bill 3342 was subsequently amended by Senator John
Tunney to include an express pre-emption provision. At the time
he sponsored the amendment, Senator Tunney stated:
[T]here was no intention in the committee bill to alter the relative
power of the federal government, state and local governments, and
airport operators over the control of aircraft noise. This amend-
ment would also retain the same powers for all parties.'
The Senate version of the bill, however, was never adopted by the
House. Instead, the Senate passed, with amendment, a House ver-
sion of the bill which was silent on the question of pre-emption!"'
Administrative Interpretation
The FAA has consistently recognized that the federal govern-
ment has not pre-empted airport proprietors' authority to regulate
the noise emissions for aircraft using their facilities. The preamble
to FAR-36 provided:
Responsibility for determining the permissible noise levels for air-
craft using an airport remains with the proprietor of that airport.
The noise limits specified in Part 36 ... are not intended to substi-
tute federally determined noise levels for those more restrictive
limits determined to be necessary by individual airport proprietors
in response to the locally determined desire for quiet and the
locally determined need for the benefits of air commerce 10
Further, the Aviation Noise Abatement Policy ("ANAP") which
was jointly issued by the Department of Transportation and the
Federal Aviation Administration on November 18, 1976, specific-
ally acknowledged the existence of this proprietorial right on nu-
1 IS. Rep. No. 92-1160, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1972).
108 118 CONG. REC. 35,868 (Oct. 13, 1972).
109Id. at 35,886.
11034 Fed. Reg. 18,355 (1969).
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merous occasions."' ANAP posed a solution to the aircraft noise
problem after considering what is technologically and financially
attainable and dividing the responsibilities among "airport pro-
prietors, federal and local government agencies, air carriers, and
manufacturers.' 12 The ANAP statement also promulgated a noise
compliance rule for existing aircraft not already subject to FAR-36
restrictions."3 A section of the report commenting on the legal re-
sponsibilities of the various parties noted that the powers of an
airport proprietor "to control what types of aircraft use its airports,
to impose curfews or other use restrictions, and, subject to FAA
approval, to regulate runway use and flight paths" were not pre-
empted."'
Thus, while Congress has not clearly or unequivocally expressed
its intent, the legislative history and administrative interpretation of
the relevant federal legislation offer support for the contention that
Congress did not intend to pre-empt airport proprietors from regu-
lating aircraft noise emission at their facilities.
Judicial Background
Griggs v. Allegheny County,"' a 1962 Supreme Court decision
which did not directly involve the question of pre-emption, sup-
plies incisive background into much of the controversy surrounding
the locus of control of aircraft noise emissions. In Griggs, a
Pennsylvania court determined that plaintiff's property had been
taken by virtue of the aircraft operations at Alleghany County Air-
port. The controversy was whether the taking was a consequence
of federal or local governmental action. A seven justice majority
of the court allocated the financial liability for the taking of an
air easement over plaintiff's property to the county airport pro-
prietor, not to the federal government. The Court observed that it
had been established in U. S. v. Causby"' that the glide path for
landing or the flight path for takeoff was not part of the navigable
air space which Congress had declared as being in the public
"I ANAP, supra note 102, at 2, 5, 9, 32-34, 50-55, 58, 59.
11' Id. at 2.
"'
2 See note 94 supra.
1 ANAP, supra note 102, at 34.
15 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
11 328 U.S. 256 (1946)
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domain. The Court held that the county as "promoter, owner, and
lessor of the airport, was in these circumstances the one who took
the air easement in the constitutional sense. 117 In support of this
decision, Justice Douglas writing for the majority, noted that the
county determined (subject to the approval of the Civil Aero-
nautics Administration) the location of the airport and all of the
significant design criteria. "The Federal Government takes noth-
ing; it is the local authority which decides to build an airport vel
non, and where it is to be located. 18
Several of the courts which have considered Griggs119 have in-
terpreted that decision as standing for the proposition that the
federal government is immune from liability for all consequences
of airport operations." ' Such a broad extrapolation of Griggs goes
too far and is responsible for generating irrelevant issues which
unnecessarily complicate the question of pre-emption of an airport
proprietor's right to regulate aircraft noise emissions. A much nar-
rower reading is appropriate. Griggs mandates immunity from lia-
bility for the federal government where its actions are indirect and
constitute a relatively minor involvement in the major decisions
relating to the airport. Dictating operating procedures for aircraft
safety or requiring federal grants for airport construction would
be such activities." ' The philosophical underpinnings of Griggs are
valid under such circumstances. More extensive federal interven-
tion such as directing an airport to accept aircraft whose noise
emissions exceed reasonably established limits or an order to
lengthen runways certainly exceeds the scope of the Griggs ruling
and would most likely subject the federal government to liability
for any consequence of such action."' The federal government's
117 369 U.S. at 89 (footnote omitted).
11 369 U.S. at 89.
.1 British Airways Bd. v. Port Auth. of N.Y., 558 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1977);
National Av. v. City of Hayward, 418 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Air
Transp. Ass'n v. Crotti, 389 F. Supp. 58 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
21558 F.2d at 83; 418 F. Supp. at 424; 389 F. Supp. at 63-64.
12149 U.S.C. § 1348(c) (1970) authorizes the Administrator to dictate op-
erating procedures. The Federal Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970,
42 U.S.C. § 1718 (Supp. V 1975), prohibits discrimination in the use of fed-
erally assisted facilities.
12 Despite the suggestion to the contrary in Secretary Boyd's letter, see supra
note 105, there is adequate authority to legitimatize such an order by virtue of
the power conveyed to the federal government under the commerce clause.
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care to avoid any action which might disturb the Griggs decision
or to cross its boundaries is dictated by the vast extent of the air-
craft noise problem"3 and the current allocation of the cost of
correcting that problem to local proprietors. This caution explains
the otherwise incongruous efforts of the government in opposing
court findings of federal pre-emption of aircraft noise regulation.""
City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc.1" is the leading
case concerning the extent of federal pre-emption of local govern-
ments' authority to regulate aircraft noise. The City of Burbank
had adopted an ordinance establishing a curfew which made it
unlawful to operate jet aircraft at the privately owned Hollywood/
Burbank Airport between the hours of 11:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m.
Justice Douglas writing for a five-member majority of the Court
analyzed the regulatory and legislative histories of the various
federal statutes concerning aviation and concluded that, "There is
to be sure, no express provision of pre-emption in the 1972 Act.
That, however, is not decisive . . . . It is the pervasive nature of
the scheme of federal regulation of aircraft noise that leads us to
conclude that there is pre-emption..'.'. The majority's judgment
was that the Noise Control Act of 1972 "reaffirms and reenforces
the conclusion that FAA, now in conjunction with EPA, has full
control over aircraft noise, pre-empting state and local control.
'12 7
In addition to a finding of pre-emption based on the pervasive
nature of federal regulation, the Court also found the need for a
123 The DOT-FAA ANAP estimated that six million Americans currently re-
side in areas exposed to significant airport noise and 600,000 people live within
the NEF-40 contour, an area severely impacted by aircraft noise. The report also
noted that in the past five years airport proprietors have paid in excess of $25
million in legal judgments or settlements in noise related suits, and have spent
over $3 million in legal fees for the defense thereof. Further, it observed that
Los Angeles had, in connection with a settlement of various lawsuits, acquired
substantial residential land adjacent to the Los Angeles International Airport and
had spent over $130 million in said acquisitions, and plans to spend an additional
$21 million on soundproofing of schools and other public buildings near the air-
port. The report also noted that 26 airports had been classified by the Air Trans-
port Association as "noise sensitive," and 100 airports had been identified as
having noise problems of some degree. ANAP, supra note 102, at 17-18.
124 In Burbank the Solicitor General of the United States filed a brief arguing
against pre-emption. Similarly, the Justice Department's amicus brief filed with
the court of appeals in the Concorde 11 denied federal pre-emption.
121411 U.S. 624 (1973).
12 Id. at 633.
127 Id.
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uniform and exclusive system of federal regulation in order to
prevent obstruction of the purposes and objectives of Congress un-
derlying the Federal Aviation Act."8 The Court endorsed the dis-
trict court's finding that the imposition of curfew ordinances on a
nationwide basis would result in the "bunching" of flights in the
hours immediately preceding or following the curfew and would,
thus, cause a loss of efficiency in the use of the airways, serve to
aggravate the noise problem, and decrease aviation safety."' The
Court adopted the district court's finding that "such a result is
totally inconsistent with the objectives of the federal statutory and
regulatory scheme."'2
Justice Douglas, however, specifically limited the extent of the
Court's finding of federal pre-emption to those instances where
state and local governments attempt to control aircraft noise by
using their police powers to regulate the flight of aircraft."' In its
review of the background of the Federal Aviation Act, as amended,
the Court cited various portions of thet legislative history of the
1968 and 1972 amendments of Section 611 of the Act which
tended to confirm a congressional intent to permit airport pro-
prietors to impose nondiscriminatory restrictions in the use of their
airports based on noise considerations.' The Court went on to
quote from the letter of Secretary of Transportation Boyd which
expressed the view that the 1968 amendment to the Act would
leave undisturbed the rights of a proprietor of an airport to issue
nondiscriminatory regulations establishing permissible levels of
noise which can be created by aircraft using their facilities. In the
much quoted footnote 14, Justice Douglas noted:
[W]e are concerned here not with an ordinance imposed by the
City of Burbank as "proprietor" of the airport, but with the exer-
cise of police power .... Thus, authority that a municipality may
have as a landlord is not necessarily congruent with its police
power. We do not consider here what limits, if any, apply to a
municipality as a proprietor."'
12 Id. at 639.
12 Id. at 627, 639.
1o Id. at 627.
I" Id. at 635 n.14.
132 Id.
"' Id. at 635 n.14 (emphasis added).
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Justice Rehnquist writing for the dissenters'" interpreted the
same legislative history which had been considered by the majority
and came to a conclusion that there was insufficient expression of
congressional intent to infer pre-emption. The dissenters' interpre-
tation of the legislative history was to a large extent dictated by
their perception of the basic structure of federalism, their prefer-
ence for decentralism, and their expansive view of states' powers."
Justice Rehnquist emphasized that states should not be pre-empted
from exercising their historic police powers "unless the requisite
pre-emptive intent is abundantly clear. '.3' Rather, he found that
"the history of congressional action in this field demonstrates ...
an affirmative congressional intent to allow local regulation"'' 7 The
finding by the dissenters of a congressional intent to allow local
regulation of aircraft noise disposed of the majority's assertion of
pre-emption of state powers based on a theory of pervasiveness of
federal regulatory schemes. Justice Rehnquist's search of the legis-
lative history led him to the conclusion that the congressional pur-
pose in enacting Section 611 was to control aircraft noise emis-
sions through "study and regulation of the 'source' of the problem
-the mechanical and structural aspects of jet and turbine aircraft
design.... Accordingly, he concluded that permitting municipali-
ties to regulate aircraft noise through the use of their police power
was not an obstacle to the accomplishment of the purposes of
Congress and, hence, not pre-empted."'
Post-Burbank Decisions
The Burbank decision left unanswered two questions which are
central to determination of the pre-emption issues which were
raised in the Concorde case. One question concerns the extent of
federal pre-emption of state regulations which attempt to control the
134 Justices Stewart, Marshall and White joined Justice Rehnquist's opinion.
135 The dissenters cited with approval from San Diego Bldg. Trades Council
v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). "[D]ue regard for the presuppositions of our
embracing federal system, including the principle of diffusion of power not as a
matter of doctrinaire localism but as a promoter of democracy ... " Id. at 243,
quoted in 411 U.S. at 643 (emphasis added by the Court).
130411 U.S. at 643.
137 Id. at 653.
"'Id. at 650.
"1 Id. at 652.
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effects of aircraft noise. This is clearly an area of residual state
authority to control aircraft noise emissions. As Justice Rehnquist
observed, Burbank does not preclude a local government from regu-
lating aircraft noise indirectly by use of its zoning powers or by
permanently closing down an airport it owns. "' The boundary be-
tween prohibited and permitted state action, between curfew and
zoning, has yet to be established. The second question is whether
airport proprietors are exempt from the pre-emption, whatever its
ultimate extent, which the court determined applicable to police
powers. Since the Burbank decision, these questions have been
addressed by four courts, "' including the court of appeals' decision
in the Concorde case. The extent of federal pre-emption of an air-
port proprietor's authority to enact aircraft noise regulation for air-
craft using its facilities was expressly undecided in Burbank al-
though the Court noted that the "FAA, now in conjunction with
EPA, has full control over aircraft noise, pre-empting state and
local control.""
In Air Transport Association of America v. Crotti" a three-
judge federal court considered the constitutionality of a California
statute'" which required the California Department of Aeronautics
to adopt noise regulations governing the operation of aircraft at
all airports in California other than those operated by the United
States. The standards adopted pursuant to the statute fell into two
categories, (1) Community Noise Equivalent Level ("CNEL")
which established as of January 1, 1986, maximum levels of air-
port noise to which residential communities could be exposed, re-
quired airports with noise problems to establish a Noise Impact
Boundary by monitoring and measuring noise levels, and suggested
various techniques for attaining the mandated noise levels; and (2)
Single Event Noise Exposure Levels ("SENEL") which established
140 id. at 653.
141National Av. v. City of Haywood, 418 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1976);
Air Transp. Ass'n v. Crotti, 389 F. Supp. 58 (N.D. Cal. 1975); and San Diego
Unified Port Dist. v. Superior Court, 67 Cal. App. 3d 361, 136 Cal. Rptr. 557
(Ct. App.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 98 S. Ct. 184 (1977).
14411 U.S. at 633.
14 389 F. Supp. 58 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
14 CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 21669-69.4 inclusive, and the implementing regu-
lations thereof, 4 CAL. ADM. CODE, §§ 5000-80.5 (referred to as California Noise
Standards adopted Nov. 25, 1970), cited in 389 F. Supp. at 60.
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maximum noise emission levels for aircraft in flight."1 The Crotti
court thus faced the question of determining the extent of federal
pre-emption of the state's authority to regulate aircraft noise emis-
sions both as a sovereign, through use of its police powers, and as
an airport owner, through use of its proprietary powers. ' The
plaintiffs contended that any local regulation of aircraft noise emis-
sion was pre-empted by the federal government and per se void
under the holdings of Burbank."" The district court found this
interpretation of Burbank overbroad. The court concluded from
the legislative history of Section 611, the FAA regulations issued
thereunder, and from footnote 14 of Burbank that:
(T)he (a)irlines' total reliance upon Burbank is misplaced. The
factual picture supporting Burbank is of a narrow focus, a single
11 389 F. Supp. at 62.
14 The Court noted that the regulations issued by an airport proprietor did
not lose that character merely because the action was directed by the state through
invocation of its police power.
The power of the State to generally regulate its political subordi-
nates, including local airport authorities, is well established as a
matter of law. City of Trenton v. N.J., 262 U.S. 182, 185-87
(1923); Transworld Airlines v. City & County of San Francisco,
228 F.2d 473 (9th Cir. 1955).
Id. at 64 n.2.
147 One commentator has stated the issue in Crotti as "the question to be de-
cided was, what are legitimate local regulations and what are not?" Warren,
Airport Noise Regulation: Burbank, Aaron and Air Transport, 5 ENVT'L AFF.
97, 117 (1976). This statement of the issues in Crotti appears appropriate. The
alternate assertion that Crotti stands for the proposition that some regulation of
aircraft in direct flight is permissible, is erroneous. At one point in the opinion,
the court stated, "The Airlines' position narrows to the simple contention that
any control and regulation of the levels of noise generated by aircraft in direct
flight is pre-empted by the federal government; .... ." 389 F. Supp. at 362
(emphasis added). If this were the question addressed in the opinion and the
subject of the later observation concerning the airlines' misplaced "reliance on
Burbank," the opinion would contain an internal contradiction. Such an inter-
pretation would have the court inferring in one portion of the opinion that air-
port proprietors were not pre-empted from regulating aircraft in "direct flight"
while in another portion of the opinion it invalidated SENEL for attempting
"regulation of noise levels which occur when aircraft is in direct flight." Id. at
65. Additionally, the court suggested that that portion of the CNEL regulations,
§ 5011(d), which suggested "reduction of the flight frequency, particularly in the
most noise sensitive time periods and by the noisier aircraft," appeared "suspect"
and "threatening." Id. at 61. Further, the court noted in its conclusion that "we
conclude that the CNEL provisions and regulations are not per se invalid as
delving into and regulating the field of aircraft operation engaged in direct flight,
which is pre-empted unto the federal government .. " Id. at 65 (emphasis add-
ed). Thus, in order to make the decision logically consistent, the court's finding
must be addressed to the question as stated above.
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police power ordinance of a municipality-not an airport pro-
prietor-intending to abate aircraft noise by forbidding aircraft
flight at certain night hours. The holding in Burbank is limited to
that proscription as constituting an unlawful exercise of the police
power in a field pre-empted by the federal government . .. .
Accordingly, the Court concluded that an airport proprietor was
not pre-empted from exercising all controls over airport noise."
The district court noted that the monitoring provisions were
passive and innocuous to air traffic, and in no way intruded on the
federal regulation of flight operations and air space management.
The court concluded:
(S)tate-dictated employment of shielding and ground level facility
configurations, as well as development of compatible land uses
under the provisions of CNEL, is so patently within local police
power control and beyond the intent of Congress in the federal
legislation that further discussions would be wasteful.!"0
The court further concluded that the CNEL provisions intruded
on the federal control of aircraft flights and operations. The regula-
tions were per se an unlawful attempt to exercise a control which
had been declared pre-empted in Burbank.'
Accordingly, the Crotti court envisioned a limited airport pro-
prietor exception to the Burbank decision."2 The source of the
power exercised, be it proprietarial or police power, was imma-
terial to a determination of permissibility. Rather, the limitation
was established by drawing the boundary line so that passive
ground regulation was permitted (land use regulation and airport
shielding), but direct control by regulation of noise emanating
from aircraft was prohibited."'
In National Aviation v. City of Hayward,1" a federal district
141 Id. at 63.
140 Id. at 63-64.
150 Id. at 65.
151 Id.
15 Id.
153 The court noted that a portion of the methodology recommended under
CNEL, § 5011(d), was suspect in that it recommended "reduction of the flight
frequency, particularly in the most noise sensitive time periods and by the noisier
aircraft." The court, however, declined to consider the enforceability of such
regulation until the question was at issue. 389 F. Supp. at 65.
15 418 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
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court considered a curfew ordinance which the City of Hayward,
California, adopted in its capacity as proprietor of the Hayward
Air Terminal." The ordinance prohibited aircraft operations at
the airport between 10:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m. by aircraft which
exceeded a noise level of 75 dBa. The ordinance provided criminal
penalties for operations in excess of the noise limits which it estab-
lished. The city contended that in adopting the ordinance in con-
troversy it was acting not as a municipality but rather in its role
as proprietor of the Hayward Airport and that, as such, its control
of aircraft noise emissions was exempt from the pre-emptive finding
of Burbank."" The plaintiffs countered that the Hayward regula-
tions were invalid by virtue of federal pre-emption of regulation of
aircraft noise emissions. They further argued that a decision per-
mitting a municipal airport proprietor to regulate the noise levels
of aircraft using its facilities would produce an anomalous result,
"namely that a municipality that owns an airport would be free
to exercise police powers in the field of airport noise regulation,
which powers if identically exercised by a different municipality
or state would unlawfully intrude into an area said to have been
pre-empted by Congress.'
7
In order to evaluate the plaintiff's contention, the court ex-
amined the legislative history of the relevant federal enactment,
the administrative regulatory practice pursuant to that legislation,
and the judicial precedents established by Griggs, Burbank, and
Crotti.
Judge Peckham observed that both parties' positions contained
inherent contradictions. A finding that there is a proprietor's ex-
ception to Burbank, which would "comport with the court's hold-
ing in Griggs. . . . [would] severely undercut the rationale of
Burbank's finding of pre-emption."'' . A finding that an airport
proprietor is precluded from regulating aircraft for the purpose of
reducing noise emissions would "impose upon airport proprietors
the responsibility under Griggs for obtaining the requisite noise
easements, yet deny them the authority to control the level of
15 Hayward, Cal. Ordinance 75-023 C.S. (Oct. 14, 1975).
15 418 F. Supp. at 421.
"
7 Id. at 423.
13, Id. at 424.
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noise produced at their airports.".... The court determined, influ-
enced largely by the 1968 letter of Secretary of Transportation
Boyd to the Senate Commerce Commission,"' that it was the clear
intent of Congress not to "prevent airport proprietors from exclud-
ing any aircraft on the basis of noise consideration....' Therefore,
the ordinance was sustained.
The court's decision in Hayward is deprived of some of its pre-
cedential efficacy by virtue of several flaws in the court's logic.
While the result appears correct, the rationale used to support that
result is deficient in several regards. Judge Peckham resolved the
dilemma which he perceived as existing as a result of the conflict
between the dictates of Griggs and Burbank in favor of Griggs.
Yet, this conflict did not in fact exist and, if it did exist, was a
consequence of the Griggs decision irrespective of the court's find-
ing in Burbank. Additionally, if an accommodation had to be
made between the Griggs decision and Burbank, it was Burbank
that should have been favored.
Griggs and Burbank conflict only if Griggs is read broadly and
Burbank narrowly. An action mandated by a regulation issued
under federal pre-emption can impose liability on an airport
proprietor only if Griggs exculpates the federal government from
liability for any such exercise of its authority. Such a reading of
Griggs is inappropriate.16' Further, the court concluded that adop-
tion of "the proprietor exception"' " which was recognized in "the
dicta in footnote 14 of the Burbank opinion' would "severely
undercut the rationale of Burbank's finding of pre-emption."''
The concept that at the very least the Burbank majority acknowl-
edged in footnote 14 the possibility of an airport proprietor exemp-
159 ld.
1l See notes 103-06 supra and accompanying text.
161 418 F. Supp. 424, quoting S. REP. No. 1353, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7
(1968).
"1 See notes 115-24 supra and accompanying text.
163 418 F. Supp. at 424.
'64 Id.
"I Id. Earlier in the opinion, Judge Peckham recognized that the Burbank
Court "was not considering 'what limits, if any, apply to a municipality as a pro-
prietor,' 411 U.S. at 635-36 n.14." 418 F. Supp. at 423. He nonetheless con-
cluded that the legislative history of the Act, the noise regulations implemented
by the FAA, and the import of Burbank dictated the existence of a proprietor
exemption to federal pre-emption.
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tion from federal pre-emption of control over aircraft noise emis-
sions stems from a misreading of the subject footnote and occasions
the Burbank side of the controversy. Recall that footnote in part
stated:
[W]e are concerned here not with an ordinance imposed by the
City of Burbank as "proprietor" of the airport, but with the exer-
cise of police power .... Thus, authgrity that a municipality may
have as a landlord is not necessarily congruent with its police
power. We do not consider here what limits, if any, apply to a
municipality as a proprietor."'
It is clear that the court was distinguishing between the police
powers of a municipality and the proprietarial powers of an airport
owner. These powers are very different and are in fact derivative
from distinctive origins. Police powers are appurtenant to the sov-
ereignty of the state while proprietarial powers are an outgrowth
of property rights."" The Burbank court's footnote should be in-
terpreted as holding that all exercises of police power to regulate
aircraft noise emissions are within the scope of the decision and
therefore are pre-empted, and that exercises of proprietarial or
similar powers to the same end were not considered. The court of
appeals, in its consideration of Burbank, adopted this approach
and distinction as a method of rationalizing Secretary Boyd's letter
and the court's finding of pre-emption."' Justice Rehnquist, in his
dissent to the Supreme Court majority's finding of pre-emption,
noted in regard to the finding of the court of appeals rationaliza-
tion, "if the statute actually enacted drew this distinction, I would
of course respect it. But since we are dealing with 'legislative his-
tory,' rather than the words actually written by Congress into law,
I do not believe it is of the controlling significance attributed to
it by the court below."'. Thus, the conflict which Judge Peckham
addressed in Hayward between Griggs and Burbank is nonexistent.
Even if Griggs is read as conferring absolute immunity from
liability on the federal government, such an interpretation cannot
provide a basis for restricting the court's decision in Burbank.
166 411 U.S. at 635 n.14 (emphasis added).
"' See note 205 infra.
16s City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 457 F.2d 668, 674 (9th
Cir. 1972).
1" 411 U.S. at 651.
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Judge Peckham conceded that Congress and the FAA could, but
had not, adopted a regulatory system which would pre-empt the
subject authority of airport proprietors."' It is this power which
when coupled with Griggs creates the potential for subjecting an
airport proprietor to liability without a corresponding ability to
mitigate that liability. Such a result is inherent in Griggs and exists
without regard to Burbank's resolution of the question of pre-
emption. While such an inequitable burden on airport proprietors
might be adequate grounds for reversing Griggs, it certainly can-
not justify tampering with Burbank!
Finally, if there must be an accommodation between Burbank
and Griggs, it is Burbank which should be favored. Burbank post-
dated Griggs by eleven years, and it is appropriate to assume that
the Court took that decision and its effects into consideration when
reaching the Burbank decision. Further, the Burbank majority
found that there was a requirement of a "uniform and exclusive
system of federal regulation if the congressional objectives under-
lying the Federal Aviation Act are to be fulfilled...... There are
766 airports in the United States which have been certified by
the FAA to accept scheduled commercial flights.'' The enact-
ment of curfews by a small number of these airports would be
disruptive to the national air navigation system. The DOT-FAA
ANAP noted that "a curfew at O'Hare, for example, would cause
a major restructuring of most of the domestic air transport sys-
tems..''. The majority's finding of pre-emption was founded on
their perception of the adverse impact on aircraft safety and
efficiency in the utilization of the navigable air space which would
170 The dissent of Justice Rehnquist in Burbank acknowledged that "clearly
Congress could pre-empt the field to local regulation if it chose, and very likely
the authority conferred on the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration by 49 U.S.C. § 1431 is sufficient to authorize him to promulgate regula-
tions effectively pre-empting local action." Id. at 424.
17 Id. at 639.
"'Statistical Abstract of the United States at 613 (1976).
"' ANAP, supra note 102, at 22. As an illustration, the report noted that if
a 10:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. curfew were imposed in New York, it would severely
disrupt shipment and handling of air freight by requiring the rescheduling of 37
percent of the New York air cargo, 23 percent of the air-transported mail, and
5 to 13 percent of passenger movements. Other disbenefits of curfew would be
the consequence of the resulting "bunching"; increased air congestion, delays,
and noise during daylight hours; inefficient utilization of aircraft and ground
equipment; and an according increase in operating costs and fares.
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be the consequence of expanded municipal curfews." The Supreme
Court's determination of the intent and purpose of Congress was
essential to its decision in Burbank and, accordingly, is mandated
as dispositive of the issue until overruled by Congress or the Court.
The rationale supporting the Hayward court's decision severely
undercuts the philosophy supporting the Burbank majority's deci-
sion and therefore can be justifiably criticized.
Nevertheless, the decision of the Hayward court that an air-
port proprietor's right to regulate the noise emissions of aircraft
using its facilities has not been pre-empted is philosophically sup-
portable. The Griggs and Burbank decisions can be made consistent
and the rights of airport proprietors protected if the pre-emption
found in Burbank is considered as relating only to the exercise of
police powers and leaving intact the powers which are appurtenant
to the ownership of property. Under the pre-emption of the
authority of a state or local government, such an interpretation, to
regulate airport noise emissions can subject neither the federal nor
local government to financial liability. Griggs held such liability
devolved on the airport proprietor. Conversely, the pre-emption of
the airport proprietor's right to control aircraft noise emissions
could subject the federal government to financial liability." From
this distinction arises the differing conclusions as to pre-emption.
It might be reasonably inferred that Congress left unsaid its intent
to surplant the authority of local governments to exercise control
over aircraft movements, noise emissions and the like. Such an
enlargement of centralized authority is consistent with the purpose
of Congress as perceived in Burbank and is free from adverse
impact on the federal government. Conversely, it is unlikely (and
probably unconstitutional) for Congress to passively or silently
agree to exercise authority which would obligate the federal gov-
ernment for financial liability. Thus, it is consistent to infer that
Congress in the interest of establishing a uniform system of federal
aviation would pre-empt local governments from regulating all
aspects of aircraft movements and at the same time leave intact the
powers of an airport owner to reasonably regulate the same."
11411 U.S. at 639.
'See notes 115-24 supra and accompanying text.
'"IThe Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970, 49 U.S.C. S 1718
(Supp. V 1975), conditions federal approval and funding of any airport de-
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Accordingly, there is adequate philosophical basis to support the
Hayward decision.
In a well reasoned decision in the case of San Diego Unified
Port District v. Superior Court,'" the Fourth District of the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals rejected the assertion of an airport pro-
prietor exception to federal pre-emption. The necessity to deter-
mine the extent of an airport proprietor's authority to regulate the
noise of aircraft using its facilities came before the court in an
unusual form, a tort action. The plaintiffs'' alleged that they were
damaged by the Port District's operation of its property. in a
tortious manner in that the aircraft noise constituted a nuisance.
They further contended that as an airport proprietor the District
was uneffected by the federal pre-emption of police power and
could control aircraft noise through the exercise of its proprietary
powers."' The District countered that its authority to control air-
craft was pre-empted by the federal government and that to the
extent that it had complied with federal regulations and laws, its
conduct could not constitute a common law nuisance."'
The appeals court noted that acceptance of the plaintiffs' asser-
velopment project on an agreement by the proprietor to operate the facility on
reasonable terms and without discriminatory rules or rates. Those provisions of
the Act at least infer a congressional acknowledgement of the authority of a
proprietor to adopt such rules.
1767 Cal. App. 3d 361, 136 Cal. Rptr. 557 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, - U.S.
98 S. Ct. 184 (1977).
" Nine hundred thirty-six individuals and one church brought two actions
against the San Diego Unified Port District. They were consolidated in Britt v.
San Diego Unified Port District, San Diego Superior Court No. 379755. The court
of appeals granted a prerogative writ to review the trial court's overruling of
defendants' demurrer to the complaint. 418 F. Supp. at 425 n.13.
"' The Port District is the proprietor of the San Diego Airport, Lindberg
Field.
18067 Cal. App. 3d at 366.
' Defendants further contended that federal pre-emption precluded "not only
local regulation by legislative action, but regulation by local judicial action as well,
e.g., Luedtke v. County of Milwaukee, 371 F. Supp. 1040, 1044 (E.D.Wis. 1974),
aff'd, 521 F.2d 387, 390-391," and "the awarding of money damages is every bit
as much a regulation of conduct by a court as the exercise of its equitable juris-
diction to regulate by injunction, e.g., San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Gar-
mon, (1959) 359 U.S. 236 .... 67 Cal. App. 3d at 365-66. The court
concluded that federal pre-emption immunized defendants from claims of negli-
gence, trespass or nuisance on account of any aircraft operations which complied
with the federal laws and regulations. The District was not immune, however,
from tort claims arising out of the management or maintenance of its facility.
Id. at 377.
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tion of an airport proprietor exception to federal pre-emption
would produce the anomalous result that "a municipality or gov-
ernmental agency may impose noise regulations in its capacity as
airport proprietor which it could not impose under its police
power . . . .(W)e doubt the Supreme Court intended such a re-
sult.' '.. After observing that a majority of the Supreme Court in
Burbank reasoned that the requirements of a uniform and exclu-
sive federal regulation of aircraft noise control were essential to
fulfill the objectives of Congress underlying the Federal Aviation
Act, the Court noted that "'if the great bulk of airport noise cases
are not to be affected .... the rationale of Burbank is defeated,'"
and "'Burbank becomes a decision of nearly unique applica-
tio n .' ,18
The court of appeals then examined the Crotti and Hayward
precedents for a source of principles by which it might resolve the
question. The San Diego court concluded that the Crotti decision
was founded on a distinction based on the nature of the regulation
and the activity regulated rather than the source of the power
exercised." "(B)oth the CNEL and SENEL regulations considered
in Crotti were exercises of state police power, rather than pro-
prietary power. If the category exercised were dispositive,
both types of regulation should have fallen......
In contrast, the court found that the rationale supporting the
Hayward court's decision was dependent on distinguishing between
the source of authority for regulation. Exercises of police powers
were pre-empt; proprietarial control exempt. The appeals court
endorsed the distinction between permitted and pre-empted airport
proprietor regulation which had been adopted in Crotti "based on
182 Id. at 368. The court's suggestion of an anomalous result stems from its
failure to distinguish between the nature of the power exercised by a state and
an airport proprietor. As Justice Douglas noted, the "authority that a municipality
may have as a landlord is not necessarily congruent with its police power." 411
U.S. at 635 n.14. The state's exercise of a police power emanates from the re-
served powers of the Tenth Amendment; the proprietor's authority from the com-
mon law right to control the use of property which is appurtenant to property
ownership. As to whether there is a distinction to this difference, see infra note
205.
1s Id. at 368 (quoting from Warren, Airport Noise Regulation, 5 ENVT'L
AFF. 97, 106 (1976)).
184 67 Cal. App. 3d at 372.
"DId. at 374.
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the nature of the regulation, i.e., land management v. air space
management.' '.. The court rejected the decision reached in Hay-
ward, concluding that the result was erroneous in that it was in-
consistent with the precedent of Burbank,"' and had misinterpreted
the holding of Crotti' 8 In its findings, the court stated:
We conclude the plaintiffs may not recover tort damages from the
Port District for the harm caused by aircraft in flight. Of the
federal decisions which have dealt with the authority of airport
proprietors after Burbank, we accept the reasoning of the Court in
Air Transport Association of America v. Crotti, supra., 389 F.
Supp. 58, which distinguished between the airport land and fa-
cility use (held subject to local regulation) and aircraft in flight
(held subject to federal regulation only). To authorize recovery
from the proprietor of an airport for injuries caused by aircraft in
flight would permit local liability for conduct within the exclusive
federal control.'8
Thus, owing to different emphases, but based on equally support-
able logic, the court of appeals reached the opposite conclusion
regarding pre-emption from that adopted by the court in Hayward.
The contention that the Port Authority is pre-empted by federal
regulation from banning Concorde from landing at JFK was the
central issue at the original trial in British Air. Bd. v. Port Auth.
of N. Y. ("Concorde I"). The airlines contended that this pre-
emption was a consequence of two separate circumstances!" First,
they contended that the pervasive federal regulation of aviation in
general and noise emission of aircraft in particular preclude and
pre-empt state and local governments from enacting conflicting
regulation. Second, they contended that Secretary Coleman's deci-
sion of February 4, 1976, constituted a specific authorization for
Concorde to land at JFK and thus pre-empted contrary action by
'Id.
' The result reached in National Av. v. City of Hayward, Cal. supra
severely undercuts the Burbank decision. Five members of the Su-
preme Court found the Burbank ordinance incompatible with the
perceived need for uniform and exclusive system of federal aircraft
noise regulation. The City of Hayward ordinance seems equally




88 Id. at 373.
119 Id. at 376.
110431 F. Supp. at 1217.
COMMENTS
the Port Authority. Judge Pollack in his decision relied exclusively
on the latter grounds. After concluding that Congress had granted
the Secretary of the Department of Transportation the requisite
authority, Judge Pollack interpreted Secretary Coleman's February
4, 1976, decision as an order directing that landing rights at JFK
be granted to Concorde.'
The Port Authority appealed Judge Pollack's decision to the
court of appeals. In British Air. Bd. v. Port Auth. of N. Y. ("Con-
corde II"), the court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision
and dismissed its underlying rationale in a perfunctory manner.'"
The court's finding on this aspect of the issues received substantial
support from an amicus curiae brief which was filed by the Justice
Department at the court's request. The government brief argued
that although President Carter and Secretary of Transportation
Adams advocated allowing Concorde to land at JFK and endorsed
former Secrotary Coleman's decision, it was not the intention of
that decision to pre-empt the Port Authority's regulation of noise at
its facilities. The Justice Department advocated an even broader
basis for its non-preemption position than that adopted by the
appellate court. In its brief, the government denied that the Execu-
tive had statutory authority to preclude the Port Authority from
establishing its own noise rules.1'
The government's construction of the Coleman decision was
based on a reading of footnote six thereto as an expressed con-
templation that the Port Authority would retain its traditional role
as airport proprietor and the consonant ability to establish nondis-
criminatory aircraft noise emission standards."H Additionally, the
191 Concorde 1, 431 F. Supp. 1216, 1225 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
192 558 F.2d at 81.
193 Brief for the United States, as amicus curiae at 4, British Airways Bd. v.
.Port Auth. of N.Y., 558 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1977).
' The FAA is the proprietor of Dulles and it is therefore a part
of my decision today to direct the Federal Aviation Administrator
to permit one Concorde flight per day at Dulles by each carrier
under the conditions noted. The situation with respect to JFK may
be complicated by the fact that under federal policy that has hither-
to prevailed a local airport proprietor had authority under certain
circumstances to refuse landing rights. If for any legitimate and
legally binding reason it should turn out that the JFK part of the
demonstration could not go forward-and no one has indicated to
me any such final disposition by JFK's proprietor-that would ob-
viously be extremely unfortunate and would greatly diminish, but
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government's position relied on the Environmental Impact State-
ment which was filed as a prerequisite to the Coleman decision
and which states:
Regardless of the federal decision on the applications, the airlines
must obtain any necessary authorization from the airport opera-
tors whose airports they propose to serve before flights could be
conducted to those airports. In this instance, while FAA operates
Dulles International Airport, the Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey operates John F. Kennedy International Airport."5
Even though the district court never reached the question of fed-
eral pre-emption because of its finding that federal supremacy was
directly invoked by virtue of the "irreconcilable conflict" between
the Secretary's order and the Port Authority ban, the court of
appeals did rule on this issue, finding that Congress has not occu-
pied the field of noise regulation to the exclusion of airport pro-
prietors."'
The court of appeals reviewed the Crotti and Hayward deci-
sions and the legislative and regulatory history of Section 611
which has been central to the decisions of the other courts which
have considered this question." Moreover, the court was influ-
enced by the position adopted in the government's amicus brief
which avidly urged non-preemption, and by the FAA's endorse-
ment in the Aviation Noise Abatement Policy of extensive pro-
prietary rights and obligations to control aircraft noise emissions.'
in my opinion it would not destroy, the validity of a demonstration.
Coleman Report, supra note 12, at 3 n.6 (emphasis added).
191 EIS at 1-4- 1-5 as cited in brief for the United States, as amicus curiae at
16, British Airways Bd. v. Port Auth. of N.Y., 558 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1977).
19 558 F.2d at 84.
197 Id. at 82-84. See also notes 125-50 supra and accompanying text.
199 Id. at 84. The ANAP statement recognized that airport proprietors could
fulfill their responsibilities to reduce aircraft noise by adopting "restrictions on
airport use that do not unjustly discriminate against any user, impede the federal
interest in safety and management of the air navigation system, or unreasonably
interfere with interstate or foreign commerce." ANAP at 5. Additionally, the
policy statement concluded that even though the FAA had authority to pre-empt
proprietor regulations, it explicitly rejected an extension of its pre-emptive power
to preclude local proprietors' control of aircraft noise. The report stated, "we
have been urged to undertake-and have considered carefully and rejected-full
and complete federal pre-emption of the field of aviation noise abatement. In our
judgment the control and reduction of airport noise must remain a shared re-
sponsibility among airport proprietors, users and governments." ANAP at 34.
Accordingly, the court of appeals found that the "Port Authority is vested ...
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Conclusions
The variant conclusions reached by the courts which have ad-
dressed the question of federal pre-emption of an airport proprie-
tor's right to regulate the noise emissions of aircraft using its
facilities are a consequence of the differing perspectives in which
the question has been framed. The courts have attempted to dis-
cern the intent of Congress in this regard from alternative points
of view: the source of power exercised (police power v. proprie-
tarial power); the nature of the entity attempting the regulation
(airport proprietors v. state governmental agencies); or the type
of controls at issue (active v. passive). Final judicial determination
of the appropriate orientation from which to view this issue can
only come from the Supreme Court.
It is unlikely that the Supreme Court, if it is presented the
question, would sustain the pre-emption by the federal government
of an airport proprietor's right to regulate the noise emissions of
aircraft using its facilities. It is clear that there has not been any
express pre-emption of such rights by either Congress or the FAA.
Further, the existence of such an airport proprietor's right does
not create the circumstances from which the Court has inferred
congressional intent for pre-emption in other cases. Absent a de-
termination (such at the San Diego court suggested had been made
in Burbank) that all non-passive regulation of aircraft noise ulti-
mately affects safety, efficiency, and the control of aircraft in direct
flight," ' there is no conflict between federal and local schemes of
regulation which precludes compliance with both. Nor does the
nature of the subject matter permit only one uniform system of
regulation."
Further, the pre-emption argument is not helped by application
of the Rice standard of "pervasiveness" (even if still valid) to infer
congressional intent to pre-empt local regulation. The legislative
history supports the conclusion that Congress was concerned with
the status of the entity exercising the regulation of aircraft noise
with the power to promulgate reasonable, nonarbitrary and nondiscriminatory
regulations that establish acceptable noise levels for the airport and its immedi-
ate environment." 558 F.2d at 7.
' 67 Cal. App. 3d at 368.
'See dissenting opinion of Justice Rehnquist in Burbank, 411 U.S. at 654 n.5.
1977]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
rather than the nature of the regulation."' Congress recognized that
airport proprietors have the obligation to obtain noise easements
and, accordingly, intended to preserve the proprietors' authority to
exclude aircraft from the use of their facilities based on noise con-
siderations."'2 The adoption of this interpretation of congressional
intent to permit proprietarial control also negates any assertion of
a pervasiveness of federal regulation that leaves no room for state
action.
The Supreme Court has substantially narrowed the grounds upon
which congressional intent to pre-empt will be inferred and has
adopted a presumption of validity of regulation which is state
directed."5 The practice utilized by the majority in Burbank of
inferring congressional intent for pre-emption from a pervasive
scheme of federal regulation has probably been abandoned by
the current Court and replaced with a requirement for a more
explicit expression of congressional intent. Further, the other
philosophical basis for a finding of pre-emption in Burbank, the
potential conflict between multiple local curfew ordinances and
the exclusive federal control of air safety and nagivation, has also
been restricted by the current Court. ' " While this narrowing of the
Court's ground for inferring pre-emption does not completely
vitiate the importance of Burbank, it does make it unlikely that the
Supreme Court will take the next step of extending the pre-emption
finding to include airport proprietors.
Burbank is not dead, however. Even though the changing phi-
losophy of the Supreme Court and the confirmation of an airport
proprietor exemption cast doubt on the current validity of the
rationale which supported the majority's decision, the practical
effect of this decision still has great relevance. The case stands for
the proposition that the federal government has pre-empted state
and local governments from utilizing their police powers to regu-
late aircraft noise."5 Further, there is still ample philosophical basis
201 See notes 86-109 supra and accompanying text.
21* See notes 105-06 supra and accompanying text.
211 See notes 69-85 supra and accompanying text.
204 See note 79 supra and accompanying text.
205 The distinction between proprietarial power and police power suggested by
the court of appeals in its decision in Burbank, 457 F.2d 667, 674 (9th Cir. 1972),
and adverted to by Justice Douglas, 411 U.S. 635 n.14, is meaningful. Cf. Justice
Rehnquist's dissent in Burbank, 411 U.S. at 564. To suggest that an airport pro-
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to justify Burbank's continuing applicability. An ultimate effect
upon aircraft in direct flight can rationally be postulated as a con-
sequence of any airport use restriction." Congress has expressly
reserved for the federal government the authority to regulate and
manage navigable air space. The ouster of local governments from
the field while at the same time preserving the right of an airport
proprietor to regulate is not inconsistent with the federal scheme,
the objective of which is to abate aircraft noise emissions while
minimizing the adverse impact on aircraft safety and the interstate
air transportation system.
Additionally, the considerations which support the partial ex-
emption of airport proprietors from the federal pre-emption con-
trol of aircraft in flight do not have the same validity when applied
to other local governmental agencies. A high degree of emotion-
ality, subjectivity, and potential for demagoguery is associated with
the issue of aircraft noise emissions. Accordingly, a non-proprietor
municipality with an airport within its jurisdictional boundaries is
unlikely to fairly and adequately balance the cost of aircraft noise
abatement, which is borne only by the airport proprietor and the
national air transport system, with the benefits of reduced noise
levels. Further, conflicting or contradictory regulation is a probable
prietor's rights to control noise emissions are a consequence of the proprietor's
police power is to suggest that many of the nation's airport proprietors are with-
out authority to control aircraft noise emission at their facilities. Several of the
nation's airports are located outside the physical boundaries of the municipalities
which own the facilities. Ignoring the differentiation in the origins of the power
would create the anomalous result that an airport proprietor which had no police
powers (e.g., Lockheed Air Terminal or Greater Cincinnati Airport) would be
unable to exercise proprietarial controls. Additionally, some airport proprietors
are not instrumentalities of the state or local governments where the facilities are
located and accordingly do not possess traditional police powers. Further, many
airports are geographically located in more than one municipality which has no
proprietarial interest in the facilities. For example, Dallas/Fort Worth Regional
Airport is jointly owned by the cities of Dallas and Fort Worth, but physically
located in the separate independent municipalities of Irving, Grapevine and Euless.
If permitted to regulate operating procedures or runway preferences under its po-
lice power, each municipality would mandate a different set of use restrictions so
as to minimize the impact on its residents without regard to the effect on its
neighbors. Such competing regulation could effectively close down the airport.
" The limit of the residual authority of the state to indirectly control aircraft
noise emissions has not been an essential issue in any litigation. The distinction
suggested by the San Diego court, land management vs. air space management
(see supra notes 186-89 and accompanying text), would appear to be an intelli-
gent compromise of the potential conflict. Such a delineation is substantially the
position adopted by the DOT and the FAA. ANAP, supra note 102, at 51.
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result of permitting state or local governments to establish "active"
regulation of aircraft noise.
The various courts which have considered the question of the
extent of federal pre-emption of an airport proprietor's authority
to control noise emissions for aircraft using its facilities have
reached differing results based on their perception of the con-
tinuing vitality of Burbank and their interpretation of the reason-
ing by which the majority reached their decision. A finding of
nonpre-emption of airport proprietors does not, however, under-
mine Burbank and is consistent with the current policy of the fed-
eral government.
The Department of Transportation and the Federal Aviation
Administration are the agencies to which Congress has delegated
the federal authority and responsibility for regulating aircraft noise.
The determination of these agencies with regard to the desirability
of airport proprietor involvement in the process of abating aircraft
noise as articulated in ANAP was the result of a quasi-legislative
process and, traditionally, will be accorded substantial weight by
the Court. Under the circumstances and based on the issues raised
in Concorde, it is, difficult to construct any rationale which would
support a Supreme Court finding of federal pre-emption of the
Port Authority's right to establish reasonable and nondiscrimina-
tory restrictions on airport noise emissions for aircraft using its
facilities.
